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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann, §77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e) (1988), whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first degree
or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable John A. Rokich,

Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against
Mr. Ross for Forgery, a second degree felony.

iv

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err in failing to suppress

Mr. Ross1 prior conviction?
A,

Was the prior conviction for Attempted

Forgery inadmissible under Rule 609(a)?
B.

Assuming the prior conviction was admissible

under 609(a)(2), did Rule 403 preclude its admission?
2.

Did the prosecutor's statement to the jury regarding

the emotional condition of the State's primary witness constitute
reversible error?
3.

Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction

for Forgery in this case?

v

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Rule 403 provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as amended) provides:
Forgery—"Writing" defined.—(1) A person is
guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating
a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any
writing so that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transferance, publication, or utterance purports
to be the act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been
executed at a time or place or an unnumbered
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be
a copy of an original when no such original
existed.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if
the writing is or purports to be:
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or
more . . .
VI

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880650-CA

RUEBEN ROSS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-501 (1953 as amended).
Mr. Ross was convicted as charged in the Information
after a jury trial held on October 27-28, 1988.

The Honorable

John A. Rokich, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah entered final judgment of conviction on
October 28, 1988.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 9, 1988, Jeanne Hunter requested that Cheryl
Muhammad, a teller at Check Mart, cash a check made out to
Ms. Hunter for two hundred dollars (Transcript R. 131, hereinafter
"T." at 75-6, State's Exhibit S-2). Ms. Hunter endorsed the check
and placed her thumb print on the back of it at Ms. Muhammad's
request (T. 76). According to Ms. Muhammad, Mr. Ross appeared at
the window with Ms. Hunter when she attempted to cash the check
(T. 76). However, Ms. Hunter presented the check and did most of

the talking (T. 76, 82, 83-4).

Ms. Muhammad asked who had written

the check, and Ms. Hunter responded that her grandmother had given
it to her (T. 77f 82). Apparently, Mr. Ross had also answered
simultaneously, stating that the check was from "our grandmother"
(T. 78). This was the only statement made by Mr. Ross (T. 83).
Ms. Hunter, who was initially charged with forgery along
with Mr. Ross, testified that she met Mr. Ross in front of a
7-Eleven store for the first time on the afternoon on which the
incident occurred (T. 13). Shortly after meeting Mr. Ross, she
claimed that she agreed to drive him to the liquor store across town
(T. 13-14).
Ms. Hunter's son, who had been in the 7-Eleven store,
returned and immediately left with Mr. Ross to search for some of
Mr. Ross1 belongings which had been taken while he talked to
Ms. Hunter.

The trio reunited, then drove to the store and various

other places.
According to Ms. Hunter, while they were driving around,
Mr. Ross told her he would give her some gas money if she would help
him cash one of his grandmother's checks (T. 19). She agreed and
took him to her house so he could use the telephone to call his
grandmother (T, 19-21).

Ms. Hunter then drove Mr. Ross to his

grandmother's house (T. 21). She claimed that Mr. Ross went inside
the house while she and her son stayed in the car (T. 22-3).
Mr. Ross returned about five to ten minutes later with a check made
out to Ms. Hunter (T. 22-3).
According to Ms. Hunter, the trio then drove to
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Check Mart, where Ms. Hunter presented the check to Ms. Muhammad
(T. 31). They waited several minutes and were then arrested
(T. 31). During her testimony, Ms. Hunter stated:
MS. HUNTER: When they took my son and my son saw
them put handcuffs on me and they took him to the
detention center, I was extremely angry. I felt
so stupid and so . . . so stupid for trying to
help him. I just did. I just can't believe that
he would just let me take my son there, just let
me take my son there like that. Rueben, why did
you do that?
(T. 34). Defense counsel asked that the witness be admonished.

The

witness apologized and started to cry (T. 34). The prosecutor then
stated:

"I was going to say the State has no further questions at

this time, your Honor.

Ms. Hunter has recently had a death in her

family and I wonder if we could have a recess."
Mr. Ross testified in his defense.

(T. 34).

He stated that he had

talked with Ms. Hunter in passing prior to the day in question
(T. 163). On the date of the incident, Ms. Hunter agreed to take
him to Super Sonic Car Wash to pick up his paycheck (T. 164).
Mr. Ross denied that he had asked her to take him to the liquor
store (T. 166).
Mr. Ross further testified that after spending about
twenty minutes looking for Mr. Ross1 missing bag, Ms. Hunter, her
son and Mr. Ross got in the car and did various errands (T. 166) and
that Mr. Ross gave Ms. Hunter three or four dollars for gas (T. 167).
After doing some errands, the trio went to Ms. Hunter's
house and Ms. Hunter and Mr. Ross talked while Ms. Hunter's son went
into the bedroom with their great dane dog (T. 167). They stayed at
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Ms. Hunter's house for thirty or forty minutes, during which she
made several phone calls (T. 167). Ms. Hunter told Mr. Ross that
she was out of work and did not have much money (T. 167).
According to Mr. Ross, Ms. Hunter wanted to cash a check,
so the three left her house and went to the home of Mr. Ross' mother
(T. 168).
Ms. Hunter was pressuring Mr. Ross to help her cash a
check.

He took her to his mother's house with the hope that his

mother would help them cash the check (T. 170-71).

When Mrs. Ross

could not help, they decided to try Check Mart.
At Check Mart, Ms. Hunter presented the check to
Ms. Muhammad (T. 173). Ms. Hunter did most of the talking (T. 174),
and Ms. Muhammad did not talk to Mr. Ross (T. 175). Shortly
thereafter, the police arrived.

When they entered the store,

Mr. Ross was not concerned because he had not done anything wrong
(T. 175-6).

He had been there fifteen to twenty minutes at that

time (T. 176).
Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion to suppress
Mr. Ross' prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983) (R. 24). After a hearing held on October 3, 1988,
the trial court ordered that the State could use Mr. Ross1
conviction for Attempted Forgery for impeachment purposes
(Transcript R. 130, hereinafter "T.H.," at 10).
The jury convicted Mr. Ross of Forgery, a second degree
felony, as charged in the Information.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error in ruling
that Mr. Ross1 prior conviction for Attempted Forgery was admissible
for impeachment purposes in the instant case.

Because of the

attempt qualification, it is unclear from the face of the charge
what steps were actually taken in the prior case.

Since no evidence

was taken at the trial court level to determine whether this was a
crime of dishonesty or false statement, the Attempted Forgery prior
conviction was not admissible under 609(a)(2).

Furthemore, applying

the applicable balancing test under 609(a)(1) establishes that the
prior conviction was also not admissible under that subsection.
Assuming, arguendo, that the conviction was admissible under
609(a)(2) / Rule 403 nevertheless precludes use of the conviction due
to the overwhelming prejudicial effect caused by the similarity
between the prior conviction and the crime charged.
The prosecutor's inadmissible statement to the jury that
Ms. Hunter was crying because she had recently had a death in her
family evoked overwhelming sympathy for the State's primary witness
and unnecessarily inflamed the jury.
There was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
for Forgery in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SUPPRESS MR. ROSS1 PRIOR CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
FORGERY.

Prior to trial, defense counsel made a motion to suppress
Mr. Ross1 prior convictions (R. 24). After argument, the trial
judge ruled that Mr. Ross1 prior conviction for Attempted Forgery
was admissible for impeachment purposes (T.H. 130 at 7-9, 10;
R. 37-38).

A. THE CONVICTION WAS NOT ADISSIBLE UNDER RULE
609(a), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
In reaching his decision, the trial judge did not clarify
whether the conviction was admissible pursuant to subsection 1 or 2
of Rule 609(a).!

By allowing the use of Mr. Ross' prior conviction

for Attempted Forgery, the trial court committed reversible error.
Rule 609(a) provides:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
The meaning of the term "dishonesty or false statement"

1 During oral argument, the State pointed out that the
only conviction it would use for impeachment purposes would be
Mr. Ross1 1983 conviction for Attempted Forgery. The Court ruled
that such conviction was admissible (R. 130 at 10). In his written
order, the judge ordered that Mr. Ross' two convictions for Forgery
were admissible (R. 37). In order to minimize the impact of such
information, defense counsel brought out such conviction on direct
examination (T. 163).
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under 609(a)(2) and the question of which crimes constitute
dishonesty or false statement under that section have been raised in
several cases before this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, See
State v, Bruce, Case No. 860325; State v. Lanier, Case No. 880101;
State v. Johnson, 870096; State v. Brown, 870504-CA.

The argument

presented in such cases is that crimes of "dishonesty or false
statement" within the meaning of subsection (2) are limited to
crimes where there is deceit or fraud involved.

The legislative

history of Rule 609(a)(2) indicates that in passing the rule,
Congress intended to limit crimes of "dishonesty or false statement"
to those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not
tell the truth.

See United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d 348 (D.C. Cir.

1976); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah App. 1988)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988), this
Court determined that robbery is not necessarily a crime "of
dishonesty or false statement for purposes of 609(a)(2)
admissibility."

JTd. at 18. This Court determined that "under

609(a)(2) inquiry may be made, at the court's discretion, regarding
the particular facts involved to determine if honesty was a
factor."

_ld. The Court went on to say that if dishonesty or false

statement were involved, then evidence of the prior conviction is
admissible under 609(a)(2).

However, if inquiry into the facts is

not made or does not establish that the crime involved acts of
dishonesty or false statement, the trial court must apply 609(a)(1)
in determining whether the prior conviction is admissible.
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Id.

In the instant case, Mr. Ross1 conviction for Attempted
Forgery is not necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement.

While forgery itself arguably involves some sort of

fraudulent conduct, the attempt classification on that crime makes
it unclear as to whether any sort of fraudulent conduct occurred.
The aspect of a forgery which makes it fraudulent is the actual
signing of another person's name or representing a document to be
something that it is not.

In an attempted forgery case, the steps

taken by the defendant which would make the crime an attempt but not
a completed transaction would not necessarily include the signing of
a check or otherwise acting in a deceitful manner.

Hence, the

attempt classification of this crime requires further inquiry
pursuant to Wight for it to be admissible under 609(a)(2).
Since inquiry into the facts of Mr. Ross1 prior
conviction was not made, 609(a)(1) is the applicable provision for
determining whether the conviction was admissible.

In State v.

Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court outlined
the "[f]actors to be considered when balancing probative value
against prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1).'1
1334.

j^d. at

Those factors are:
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing
on the character for veracity of the witness;
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the
prior conviction . . . ;
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to
the charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad
person;
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[4] The importance of credibility issues
in determining the truth in a prosecution tried
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . . ;
[5] The importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of
convictions probative of the accused's character
for veracity . . . .
Id.

The State "has the burden of persuading the Court that the

probative value of admitting convictions, as far as shedding light
on the defendant's credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect on
the defendant."

Id.

In Banner, the Court held that the trial judge

committed reversible error in denying Mr. Banner's motion to
suppress convictions for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape.
In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court applied the factors set forth in Banner and held that
the trial court committed reversible error in denying the
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress convictions for Rape and
Escape.
In the instant case, the prosecutor "offered no evidence
that introduction of the convictions was more probative than
prejudicial."

^d. at 1334.2

instead, the prosecutor stated "the

only conviction that the State would plan on using for impeachment
purposes at trial would be the 1983 conviction for Attempted
Forgery.

I have a case—" (R. 30 at 10). The trial court then

stated, "I think I will let that one in."

See Addendum A for entire

transcript of argument and ruling regarding the admissibility of

2

This is identical to the situation in Banner where the
prosecutor offered no such evidence. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1334.
- 9
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Mr. Ross1 prior convictions.
An application of the five factors set forth in Banner
and Gentry establishes that Mr. Ross' prior conviction for Attempted
Forgery should not have been admitted under 609(a)(1).
Firstf although a conviction for Forgery arguably has
more bearing on the character for veracity than a conviction for
Rape or some other crimes, in the present case where the conviction
was for Attempted Forgery and the Court did not inquire into the
facts, it is impossible to ascertain what occurred in the prior
case.

Because of this, the weight to be given the prior conviction

cannot be established.

Under such circumstances, the weight given

the nature of the crime should not be in favor of inclusion.
However, even if this Court determines that the nature of an
Attempted Forgery is such that it has a bearing on the character for
veracity of the accused, the weight in favor of inclusion should be
minimal due to the attempt qualification and the failure to inquire
into the facts.
Second, the conviction from 1983 was five years old.
Banner and Gentry suggest that cases eight or nine years old are
sufficiently remote that the age should weigh against inclusion. A
conviction which is five years old is not particularly recent or
remote and therefore does not add weight to the State's argument for
admission.
Third, the Attempted Forgery conviction is identical to
the crime charged except for the attempt qualification.

A jury

which was not given further information about the prior conviction

-in-

could easily conclude that it was an identical situation.

This

weighs in favor of exclusion of the Attempted Forgery conviction
since the "close resemblance may leave the jury to punish the
accused as a bad person."

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.

In both Banner

and Gentry, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the similarity
between the prior conviction and the crime charged is a significant
factor weighing in favor of exclusion since such similarity is
"highly likely to prejudice jurors and unduly influence their
conclusion regarding defendant's guilt."

Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037.

In State v. Banner, the Court acknowledged that where the
prior convictions are similar to those charged, the probative value
of such convictions will rarely outweigh the prejudicial effect.
Banner at 1334, n.44.

In Banner, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated:

Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial
effect is especially pertinent when the witness is
the defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . .
This is particularly important when, as here, the
prior conviction is for the same type of crime
involved in the matter under present
consideration. In this type of situation, the
probative value of the evidence as affecting the
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and
the prejudice to the party.
Banner at 1334, n.44 (quoting Terry v. Z .CM. I. , 605 P.2d 314, 325
(Utah 1979)).

The similarity between the Attempted Forgery and the

crime of Forgery charged in the instant case weighs very strongly
against admission of the Attempted Forgery conviction.
Fourth, in the instant case, the physical evidence
consisted of the check made out to Ms. Hunter and Ms. Hunter's
signature and thumb print on the back of the check.
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The testimony

of Ms. Muhammad established that Ms. Hunter did most of the talking
and was the person who actually presented the check (T. 75, 11,
82-84).

While the State may argue that under such circumstances,

credibility issues were important to this case and required that the
State be able to impeach Mr. Ross, such an argument would ignore the
fact that Ms. Hunter had a prior conviction which the defense was
not permitted to use (R. 37). Under such circumstances, allowing
the State to rely on the importance of credibility issues in order
to tip the balance in favor of inclusion would be fundamentally
unfair.
Finally, Mr. Ross' testimony was of extreme importance in
this case.

The primary evidence against him consisted of the

testimony of Ms. Hunter, the person who actually presented the
check, endorsed it, and put her thumb print on it.

Because she

claimed that he was responsible for all of her actions, it was
necessary that he be able to testify.

Under such circumstances, the

fifth factor weighs against inclusion.
Given the State's burden under 609(a)(1) and the
overwhelming prejudicial effect of the similarity of the prior
crime, along with the fact that one of Ms. Hunter's prior
convictions was suppressed, the State failed to sustain its burden
of establishing that the probative value of the prior conviction
outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Although the record is unclear

as to whether the trial judge admitted the prior conviction under
subsection (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2), this failure to establish
that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the
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prior conviction shows that admission under 609(a)(1) was improper.
Hence, the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Ross1 prior conviction
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609.

B. EVEN IF MR. ROSS1 PRIOR CONVICTION WAS
ADMISSIBLE UNDER 609(a)(2), RULE 403 PRECLUDES ITS
USE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.
Even if Mr. Ross1 prior conviction were considered a
crime of "dishonesty or false statement" under Rule 609(a)(2), it
nevertheless should have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983).

Rule 403 provides:

Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 403 is a flexible rule which provides the trial judge with
discretion to exclude a defendant's prior conviction where the
result of admitting the conviction would be to unduly prejudice the
defendant.

Because of the overwhelming prejudicial effect of

evidence that a defendant has previously been convicted of a crime,
Rule 403 is necessary to insure that the proceedings are fair and
the jury's decision is based on the truth and not on its belief that
the defendant is a "bad person" or has a criminal propensity.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
overwhelming prejudicial effect of prior convictions of a defendant
and has, in several contexts, limited the ability of the State to
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place information regarding those convictions in front of the jury.
See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740-1 (Utah 1985); State v.
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372-3 (Utah 1988); State v. James, 767 P.2d
549, 556-7 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-8 (Utah
1988) (Justice Zimmerman concurring).
It is well established in this state that the use of
prior conviction evidence must be carefully scrutinized since such
evidence can have a prejudicial effect to the defendant in two
areas:

First, the jury may believe that the defendant has a

criminal propensity and therefore probably committed the crime with
which he is presently charged, and, second, the jury may decide that
the defendant is a bad person who should be punished for his prior
acts.
1983).

See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir.
When the prior conviction which the State seeks to use is

similar or identical to the crime charged, the prejudicial effect to
the defendant is overwhelming.
In the present case, where Mr. Ross' prior conviction was
for Attempted Forgery, the similarity between that conviction and
the crime of Forgery which was charged emphasizes the need for a
determination under Rule 403.
Rule 102, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), adds support to
the notion that even if a conviction is considered a crime of
dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2), the trial court must nevertheless
apply the Rule 403 balancing test.

Rule 102 provides:

These rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that
_

1 A

_

the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.
Utah has not dealt directly with the issue of whether it
is appropriate to apply Rule 403 after a determination that a prior
conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2).

However, this Court as

well as the Utah Supreme Court has determined that it is appropriate
to apply Rule 403 after a determination that evidence of prior bad
acts is admissible under Rule 404(b).

See State v. Shickles, 760

P.2d 291 (Utah 1985); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1989).

Given the purpose of the Rules of Evidence and case law in

this state recognizing the overwhelming prejudicial impact of prior
conviction evidence, an application of Rule 403 after a
determination that a prior conviction is otherwise admissible under
609(a)(2) is appropriate.
The standard employed under Rule 403 is different from
that set forth under Rule 609(a)(1).

Under 609(a)(1), the State

must persuade the trial judge that the probative value outweighs the
prejudicial effect.

However, under Rule 403, the balance is

reversed; the evidence will be excluded only if its probative value
is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

Hence, the test under Rule

403 is more stringent than that under 609(a)(1) and would require
exclusion in less cases. Nevertheless, it would provide an
opportunity for the trial judge to exclude a prior conviction which
is otherwise admissible under 609(a)(2) where admitting that
conviction would taint the entire proceedings and interfere with the
ascertainment of truth and the just determination of the issues.
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The distinction between subsection (a)(1) and subsection
(a)(2) of Rule 609 remains even if Rule 403 is applied.
(a)(1) involves felonies only.

Subsection

Under that subsection, it would be

much easier for a defendant to have the prior conviction excluded
than it would be under Rule 403.

Subsection (a)(2) involves

misdemeanors as well as felonies where the crime involved dishonesty
or false statement.

Furthermore, due to the more stringent standard

under Rule 403, such "crimes of dishonesty or false statement" would
only be excluded where they were so extremely prejudicial that they
substantially outweighed any probative value that existed.
Most of the federal circuits have either not addressed
the issue presented in this case under the federal rules or have
specifically left that issue open.

While the circuits that have

addressed the issue have determined that Rule 403 is not applicable
where a prior conviction is admissible under 609(a)(2)/ those
decisions are not dispositive.
In United States v.Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980), a
divided court relied on the federal legislative history to reach its
decision that Rule 403 is not applicable where a prior conviction is
otherwise admissible under 609(a)(2).

The Toney Court pointed out

that "[r]ule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of a prior criminal
conviction for a crimen falsi offense shall be admitted to attack a
witness1 credibility during cross-examination.

When discussing Rule

609(a)(2), Congress made this clear:
The admission of prior convictions involving
dishonesty and false statement is not within the
discretion of the court. Such convictions are
peculiarly probative of credibility and, under
- 16 -

this rule, are always to be admitted. Thus,
judicial discretion granted with respect to the
admissibility of other prior convictions is not
applicable to those involving dishonesty or false
statement."
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. Min. News, pp. 7098, 7103."

Toney, 615 F.2d

at 279.
The Toney Courtfs interpretation of the quoted passage is
erroneous.

The passage itself, with the term nunder this rule,"

refers specifically to Rule 609.

The last sentence of the quote

specifically discusses the grant of judicial discretion under Rule
609(a)(1) and in no way refers to Rule 403.

The Toney Court's

conclusion that this passage supports the proposition that Rule 403
is not applicable where a conviction is otherwise admissible under
Rule 609(a)(2) goes far beyond what was actually said.
Furthermore, the Toney Court's conclusion fails to
consider the legislative history in its entirety.

As this Court and

the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged, Rule 609 was extensively
debated.

According to at least one commentator, few comments made

during the debate on Rule 609 "went unchallenged."

See 50

U.Cinn.L.Rev. 380, 390 (1981), "The Interaction of Rule 609(a)(2)
and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:

Can Evidence of a Prior

Conviction Which Falls Within the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) Be
Excluded by Rule 403?"

That commentator points out that during the

debate in the House, Representative Lott (R. Miss.) stated:
A concern expressed by those endorsing the
Committee version of the Rule is that permitting
evidence of all prior felony convictions would
have a deterrent effect upon defendants with
- 17 -

criminal records who wish to testify in their own
behalf. In the interest of justice, however, a
jury is entitled to any evidence bearing on a
testifying defendant's tendency to tell the
truth. In a case where there is an unusual danger
that the admission of the evidence of the prior
convictions would unfairly prejudice the defendant
on the merits of the case, a remedy is provided by
the general provision of Rule 401 [sic], which
states . . . [Rule 403 was then read].
120 Cong. Rec. 2381 (1974)."

.Id. at 391.

This suggests that the

House believed that 403 would be applicable even if a prior
conviction were admissible under 609(a)(2).
The same commentator also points out that the Conference
Committee Report suggests "that Congress intended courts to have the
general discretion of Rule 403 to exclude evidence of a Rule
609(a)(2) conviction if the probative value of the prior conviction
evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial
effect" (Ld. at 391) and cited the very same passage cited by the
Toney Court in support of that proposition.

Hence, the Toney

Court's reliance on the legislative history of Rule 609 to support
its holding is erroneous.
In his dissent in Toney, Judge Tuttle pointed out that
"application of Rule 403 of the federal Rules of Evidence to Rule
609(a) will [not] necessarily contravene the intent of Congress to
treat these two types of convictions differently."
at 283.

Toney, 615 F.2d

He further pointed out that Rule 403 "expresses recognition

that evidence which is relevant, probative and admissible under
other rules, may nonetheless be so prejudicial that it should be
excluded."

id. at 283.

He concluded that "the probative value of a
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conviction involving dishonesty is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, when the prior
conviction concerns the same kind of offense for that which the
defendant is being tried.

A judge should not be prohibited from

excluding this evidence by a rigid holding that Rule 403 can never
be applied to Rule 609(a)(2)."

16. at 284.

In United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir.
1981), the Court relied on Toney and the same portion of legislative
history relied on in that case to reach its decision.

See also

United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1983) (relying on
United States v. Kiendra and same erroneous interpretation of
legislative history).
Because of the misinterpretation of the federal
legislative history, the cases which have reached this issue and
found that 403 is not applicable are not persuasive.
In order to insure the fairness of a trial and in light
of the overwhelming prejudicial impact which prior convictions can
have, it is necessary that a trial judge be able to exclude a prior
conviction under Rule 403 if it meets that test for exclusion even
though the conviction would otherwise be admissible under
609(a)(2).

In the present case, where Mr. Ross1 prior conviction

was almost identical to that with which he was charged, the
overwhelming prejudicial impact of that conviction substantially
outweighed any probative value it might have as to his credibility.
The jury likely learned of the conviction and reasoned that since he
had committed such a crime before, he committed the crime in this
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case.
The trial judge erred in allowing the use of Mr. Ross1
prior conviction for impeachment purposes and, as a result, the
conviction should be overturned and the case remanded for a new
trial.

POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT TO THE JURY
REGARDING THE EMOTIONAL CONDITION OF THE STATE'S
PRIMARY WITNESS CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Jeanne Hunter was the principal witness in the State's
case against Mr. Ross.

According to Cheryl Muhammad, Ms. Hunter

presented for cashing the check which gave rise to the criminal
charges in this case (T. 75-6).

Ms. Hunter signed the back of the

check and placed her thumb print on it (T. 76). According to
Ms. Muhammad, Ms. Hunter claimed that the check came from her
grandmother (T. 77-8).
During Ms. Hunter's testimony, she claimed that she had
just met Mr. Ross and did not know anything about the forgery.

She

stated that as a result of her arrest in the instant case, her
eleven-year-old son had been taken to a detention center (T. 33).
Ms. Hunter stated, "I can't believe that he [Mr. Ross] would just
let me take my son there, just let me take my son there like that"
(T. 33-4).

She then turned to Mr. Ross and asked, "Rueben, why did

you do that?" (T. 34).
Defense counsel interceded, asking that the witness be
admonished (T. 34). The witness apologized and began to cry
(T. 34). Thereafter, the prosecutor compounded the inflammatory
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nature of Ms. Hunter's statements and actions by stating that
"Ms. Hunter has recently had a death in her family" (T. 34). In so
doing, the prosecutor committed prejudicial error.
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the Utah
Supreme Court outlined the applicable test for determining whether
statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument are so
objectionable as to require reversal.

That test is (1) "Did the

remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict?" and
(2) "Were they, under the circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks?" j[(3. at 426.
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court again embraced the Valdez test and explained that
"[s]tep two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the
circumstances of the case as a whole.

In making such a

consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of
defendant's guilt." J^d. at 486.

In Troy, the Court went on to

explain that where "proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial"
[citation omitted], but "in a case with less compelling proof, [the]
court will more closely scrutinize the conduct."

Id.

In the instant case, the prosecutor's statement that
Ms. Hunter had recently suffered a death in the family is not
relevant and served only to invoke the sympathy of the jurors.
Although the information was not emphasized in closing arguments, it
had a greater impact because it was presented to the jurors as if it
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were an accepted fact, without giving Mr. Ross the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.

The prosecutor had an obligation to not

only present her case but also to insure that her tactics not
unnecessarily inflame the jury.

The comment by the prosecutor in

the instant case fit within the first prong of the Valdez test in
that it offered information to the jurors which they were not
justified in considering in determining their verdict.
The second prong of the Valdez test was also met in the
instant case.

As outlined in Point III, there was very little

evidence in this case which would support a conviction of Mr. Ross.
What evidence did exist came from Ms. Hunter.

Ms. Hunter was

initially charged in this case and the charges subsequently
dropped.

As an active participant in presenting the check to the

cashier, her testimony that Mr. Ross was the only responsible person
was highly suspect.

This case essentially involved a question for

the jury as to which witness was more believable:
Mr. Ross.

Ms. Hunter or

Under such circumstances, the sympathy for Ms. Hunter

evoked by the prosecutor's statement tipped the balance in favor of
Ms. Hunter.
This Court should review this issue since it was "plain
error," even though defense counsel did not object to the
prosecutor's statement at the time it was made.

In State v.

Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused
to address the prosecutional misconduct issue due to defense
counsel's failure to object; however, the Shickles Court did not
discuss whether the misconduct constituted "plain error" and,
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therefore, apparently did not believe that it was plain error
requiring reversal.
In State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Feb. 1,
1989), Justice Zimmerman discussed the concept of plain error which
is embodied in Utah Rules of Evidence 103(d) (1983).
states:

That rule

"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain

errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought
to the attention of the court."
Two requirements must be met for a finding of plain
error:

(1) That the error was plain or "should have been obvious to

a trial court" [citations omitted] and (2) that the error had a
substantial impact on the verdict.

Id.

at 18-19.

In the instant case, the erroneous nature of the
prosecutor's comment should have been obvious to the trial court.
Such a spontaneous comment from a prosecutor about matters which are
not relevant to the proceedings should never be made in front of the
jury.
Furthermore, this statement had a substantial impact on
the verdict.

Mr. Ross1 testimony indicated that Ms. Hunter was the

perpetrator of the forgery in this case.

He testified that he was

in the store to buy a soda and knew nothing about the transaction.
Mr. Ross' testimony was more consistent with that of the teller than
was that of Ms. Hunter; yet, the jury had to believe Ms. Hunter's
testimony in order to find Mr. Ross guilty.
Under such circumstances, this Court should review the
misconduct in this case and reverse Mr. Ross1 conviction and remand
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the case for a new trial.

POINT III. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR FORGERY.
Despite the presumption in favor of a jury's verdict,
this Court nevertheless has the ability to review a verdict to
determine whether sufficient evidence existed.

The Utah Supreme

Court has repeatedly stated:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime for which he was convicted.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (1983); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d
1161 (1980); State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980); State v.
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985).

This Court has followed

the same standard for reviewing cases for sufficiency of the
evidence.

State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987).

This standard restates the due process requirement which prohibits a
criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the defendant is charged.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
In order to sustain a conviction for Forgery, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element contained in Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1953 as amended).

That section provides in

pertinent part:
76-6-5Q1. Forgery—"Writing" defined.—(1) A
person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to

defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone,
he:

(b) Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that
the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance,
transferance, publication, or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time
or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy
of an original when no such original
existed.

(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if
the writing is or purports to be:

(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or
more . . .
In the present case, the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive and
so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross committed the crime for which he
was convicted.
The evidence that Ms. Hunter presented the check to
Ms. Muhammad for cashing and that the check was made out to
Ms. Hunter and endorsed by Ms* Hunter is uncontroverted.

According

to Ms. Muhammad, Ms. Hunter presented the check and did most of the
talking (T. 76, 82, 83-4).

The only statement made by Mr. Ross was

a simultaneous response to Ms. Muhammad's question as to who had
given Ms. Hunter the check (T. 77, 78, 83). Ms. Muhammad did not
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otherwise talk to Mr. Ross, and he did not otherwise participate in
the transaction.
In light of the testimony of Ms. Muhammad that Ms. Hunter
was the principal participant in attempting to cash the check, the
testimony of Ms. Hunter was critical to the State's case.

That

testimony is so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross committed the
forgery.
Ms. Hunter had met Mr. Ross only that afternoon.
Nevertheless, according to her testimony, she was willing to drive
him to the liquor store and help him find his missing belongings.
In addition, shortly after meeting him, she was willing to accept a
check made out to her for a significant amount of money and attempt
to cash it even though she had not met the person whom she
supposedly believed had written the check.

Furthermore, Ms. Hunter

fabricated answers for the clerk and otherwise acted as if she had
been involved in obtaining the check which was made out to her.
Mr. Ross1 testimony regarding the transaction at
Check Mart was substantially the same as that of the teller whereas
Ms. Hunter's testimony was not.

Mr. Ross testified that he believed

it was Ms. Hunter's check and that he was simply trying to help her
get it cashed.

His actions in waiting around the store for fifteen

to twenty minutes and in not responding when the police officers
arrived indicated that he did not have an awareness that the check
might be forged.
In light of the inherently improbable testimony of
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Ms. Hunter and the actions or lack of action by Mr. Ross, there was
insufficient evidence in this case to convict him of a forgery.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal as
the result of insufficient evidence or, in the alternative, for a
new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

1

MS. REMAL:

OUR NEXT MOTION HAS TO DO WITH

2

DEALING WITH MR. ROSS'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS, AND I HAVE

3

GIVEN YOU A STACK OF CASES THAT DEAL WITH THAT.

4

IS THE BANNER CASE, UTAH SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL

5

CASES THAT DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEFT

6

RELATED TYPES OF OFFENSES ARE CRIMES OF DISHONESTY

7

UNDER OUR RULE AND I THINK IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT OUR

8

RULE IS FASHIONED VERBATIM AFTER THE FEDERAL RULE AND

9

FOR THAT REASON WE HAVE FEDERAL CASES THAT WE HAVE

10

GIVEN YOU.

11

PARTICULAR THE DISSENTS BY JUSTICE JACKSON OR JUDGE

12

JACKSON INDICATE THAT IN HIS OPINION THESE TYPE OF

13

OFFENSES ARE NOT CRIMES OF DISHONESTY UNDER THE

14

PROVISIONS OF OUR STATUTE WHICH IS EXACTLY THE SAME AS

15

THE FEDERAL STATUTE.

16

STATE

THERE

VERSUS MOREHOUSE SAYS, IN

I THINK THAT IS QUITE CLEAR FROM UNITED

17

STATES VERSUS SMITH CASE, ALSO A FEDERAL CASE.

I THINK

18

IT'S ABOUT TEN YEARS OLD.

19

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND THE RULE AND THE PASSING OF

20

THE RULE BY CONGRESS AND IT INDICATES ON PAGE 362 THAT

21

BY THE

22

MEANING AN OFFENSE IN THE NATURE OF WHAT THEY CALL

23

CRIMES OF CRIMEN FALSI;

24

OF DECEIT, UNTRUTHFULNESS, OR FALSIFICATION BEARING ON

25

THE ACCUSED'S PROPENSITY TO TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY.

THERE'S QUITE A BIT OF

PHRASE "DISHONESTY AND FALSE STATEMENT" THEY'RE

OTHER WORDS HAVING AN ELEMENT

1

AND IN THIS CASE THEY FOUND THAT, IN FACT,

2

ROBBERY FOR INSTANCE WAS NOT SUCH AN OFFENSE AND DID

3

NOT QUALIFY

4

STATEMENT.

5

THAT SAME REASONING AND FOUND IN FACT BURGLARY WAS NOT

6

A CRIME OF DISHONESTY.

7

BURGLARY AND GRAND THEFT WERE NOT CRIMES OF DISHONESTY

8

UNDER THAT REASONING, AND AGAIN IN STATE VERSUS

9

MOREHOUSE THE MAJORITY DON'T —

AS A CRIME OF DISHONEST OR FALSE
U. S. VERSUS SEAMSTER CASE FOLLOWED

U S. VERSUS GLENN CASE FOUND

JUSTICE JACKSON SAID

10

THESE OPINIONS ARE WELL FOUNDED AND THOSE TYPES OF

11

OFFENSES DO SOMETIMES NOT QUALIFY AS CRIMES OF

12

DISHONESTY

13

THE KINDS OF OFFENSES WE HAVE HERE ARE, IN

14

FACT, CRIMES INVOLVING THEFT-TYPE OFFENSES.

15

IN 1983 AN ATTEMPTED FORGEY CONVICTION, IN 1978 A

16

BURGLARY CONVICTION, IN 1983 ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF

17

A DANGEROUS WEAPON CONVICTION, AND A CLASS A THEFT BY

18

EXTORTION IN 1986.

19
20
21

WE HAVE

IT IS MY POSITION THAT NONE OF THOSE, BASED
ON THE --.
THE COURT:

1983, WOULDN'T THAT — .

22

MS. REMAL:

EXCUSE ME.

23

THE COURT:

THE ONE COMMITTED IN 1983, THE

24
25

ATTEMPTED FORGEY

—

MS. REMAL:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT

1

BECAUSE, NUMBER ONE, I HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANY

2

CASES THAT DEALT STRICTLY WITH FORGEY

3

THE COURT:

—

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT'S SIMILAR TO

4

WHAT WE'RE DOING HERE, FORGEY BY DECEPTION.

5

HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT.

6

MS. REMAL:

I DON'T

I THINK THE ONLY QUESTION I WOULD

7

HAVE IS WHETHER OR NOT, BECAUSE IT WAS ATTEMPTED FORGEY,

8

THERE MIGHT BE A DIFFERENCE.

9
10

THE COURT:

WAS HE CONVICTED OF THAT, OR DID

HE PLEAD, OR WAS HE CONVICTED BY A JURY?

11

MS. REMAL:

IT WAS A PLEA.

12

THE COURT:

A PLEA.

MS. REMAL:

THAT MAY BE, BUT I THINK

13

SO THEY PROBABLY REDUCED

IT.

14
15

REALISTICALLY WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH WHAT THE CONVICTION

16

IS.

17

THE COURT:

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THAT ONE

18

COULD BE ADMITTED.

19

TEN YEARS OLD SO THAT ONE IS TOO REMOTE, EVEN THOUGH

20

ON THE NEXT ONE A FULL TEN YEARS HASN'T YET ELAPSED AND

21

THE OTHER WAS A CLASS A.

22
23
24
25

THE 78, I HAVE —

MS. REMAL:

WELL, THAT ONE IS

CLASS A BY EXTORTION AND ATTEMPTED

POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON.
THE COURT:

DANGEROUS WEAPON, I'M NOT

SO SURE THAT WOULDN'T BE MORE PREJUDICIAL.

1

MS. BYRNE:

YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD SIMPLIFY

2

THIS.

3

DISCUSSING EARLIER WHERE MISS GOODFELLOW WAS INVOLVED.

4

THAT WOULD BE THE PRIOR BAD ACT THAT THE STATE WOULD

5

SEEK TO HAVE RECEIVED, ADDUCED.

6

THAT THE STATE WOULD PLAN ON USING FOR IMPEACHMENT

7

PURPOSES AT TRIAL WOULD BE THE 1983 CONVICTION FOR

8

ATTEMPTED FORGEY.

9

MS. BYRNE:
THAT WE WOULD

12
13

THE ONLY CONVICTION

I HAVE A CASE

THE COURT: I THINK I WILL LET THAT ONE IN.

10
11

THE 1986 EXTORTION CASE IS THE ONE THAT WE WERE

THAT WOULD BE THE ONLY ONE

—

THE COURT:

THE REST OF THEM WON'T COME IN.

WON'T LET THE REST OF THEM COME IN.

14

MS. REMAL:

AS I INDICATED, I THINK A

15

DISTINCTION OUGHT TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN FORGEY AND

16

ATTEMPTED FORGERY.

17

MOTION, YOUR HONOR, WAS A MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND MS.

18

BYRNE HAS GIVEN ME A RESPONSE TO THAT AMD I THINK WE

19

HAVE EVERYTHING THAT WE NEED, AND IF I DISCOVER

20

OTHERWISE I'LL CONTACT HER.I THINK WE WENT THROUGH

21

THAT.

22

THE COURT:

SO, FOR THAT REASON —

ALL I HAVE TO RULE

23

WHETHER MISS GOODFELLOW CAN TESTIFY.

24

ISSUE.

25

OUR OTHER

UPON IS

THAT IS THE ONLY

IF YOU'RE NOT GOING TO MENTION THE EXTORTION

